Paper: “Gradual Bargaining in Decentralized Asset Markets”

Abstract: We introduce a new approach to bargaining, with strategic and axiomatic foundations, into models of decentralized asset markets. According to this approach, which encompasses the Nash (1950) solution as a special case, bilateral negotiations follow an agenda that partitions assets into bundles to be sold sequentially. We construct two alternating-offer games consistent with this approach and characterize their subgame perfect equilibria. We show the revenue of the asset owner is maximized when assets are sold one infinitesimal unit at a time. In a general equilibrium model with endogenous asset holdings, gradual bargaining reduces asset misallocation and prevents market breakdowns.

Check also “Bargaining under Liquidity Constraints: Unified Strategic Foundations of the Nash and Kalai Solutions” (with Tai-Wei Hu)

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