Search and Matching in Macro and Finance Virtual Seminar Series

Spring 2024

Just in!

Upcoming Seminars

Laura Pilossoph (Duke)<br>12pm ET<br>March 11, 2024
Laura Pilossoph (Duke)
12pm ET
March 11, 2024

“Labor Market Search with Imperfect Information and Learning” with John Conlon, Matthew Wiswall and Basit Zafar

Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (Princeton)<br>12pm ET<br>April 8, 2024
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (Princeton)
12pm ET
April 8, 2024

“Funding Horizons, Interest Rates, and Growth” with John Moore and Shengxing Zhang

Agostino Capponi (Columbia)<br>12pm ET<br>May 13, 2024
Agostino Capponi (Columbia)
12pm ET
May 13, 2024

“Supply Network Fragility” with Chuan Du and Joseph Stiglitz

Don’t forget to check our past seminars!

Purpose

The purpose of our series is to facilitate the exchange of ideas in macroeconomics and finance with an emphasis on:

  • search and matching,
  • networks,
  • intermediation,
  • market structure and design,
  • information frictions, and
  • other issues surrounding decentralized markets.

Organizers

  • Zach Bethune (Rice)
  • Briana Chang (Wisconsin)
  • Lucas Herrenbrueck (Simon Fraser)
  • Lukas Altermatt (University of Essex)
  • Ioannis Kospentaris (Athens University)
  • Batchimeg Sambalaibat (Princeton)
  • Liyan Shi (Carnegie Mellon)
  • Bruno Sultanum (Richmond Fed)
  • Semih Uslu (Johns Hopkins)
  • Shengxing Zhang (LSE)

Senior Advisory Board

  • Darrell Duffie (Stanford)
  • Burton Hollifield (Carnegie Mellon)
  • Ricardo Lagos (NYU)
  • Ben Lester (Philly Fed)
  • Guido Menzio (NYU)
  • Pierre-Olivier Weill (UCLA)
  • Randall Wright (Wisconsin)

Acknowledgements


Prices change with varying frequency in all markets, and, unless a market is completely centralized, no one will know all the prices which various sellers (or buyers) quote at any given time. A buyer (or seller) who wishes to ascertain the most favorable price must canvass various sellers (or buyers) – a phenomenon I shall term “search.” — George Stigler, 1961

Please contact us to give feedback or ask questions!